
# Useless Metaphors? Why Specifying Security is So Hard

DIMACS Workshop on Useable Privacy and Security Software Patrick McDaniel - AT&T Research July 8th, 2004



# What is security policy?

- Statement of expected or desirable behavior within some defined scope
- A *policy system* is a collection of abstractions, representations, interfaces, and implementations used to *specify* and *enforce* policy
  - Realization of underlying model (metaphors)
  - RBAC, B-LP, P3P, Keynote, Antigone, IE Privacy
- Problem: Why don't we have effective interfaces for security policy?

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#### Goals

- A policy system is effective if
  - Allows users to state (interface)
  - what they want (intent)
  - in terms they understand (vocabulary) ...
  - ... and the system meets that specification. (enforcement)
- Examples:
  - IE Cookie Management Policy : no TP cookies
  - Systrace Policy: 1s process cannot open
  - network connections

# Clearly, we are not there ...

Policy is to CISCO as security is to Microsoft

interface Tunnel0-la67sd description Tunnel to router at 1b67sd ip address 192.68.23.22 31 tunnel source adf0lorat22 tunnel destination sd02forat23 evit

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exit crypto isakmp policy 10 authentication pre-share encryption 3des group 3 hash sha



 Moreover, Security is to Microsoft because of default (open functionality) policy, and no clear way to see or change default policy

## **One Perspective**

 Hypothesis: Security Policy Systems largely fail because designers fail to present a clear narrative\* to the user



 Experiment: Look at guidelines for fiction and non-fiction writing

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=S&W, my 6th grade primer, ARMY handbook, Harlequin Romance, BBC, web style guides ...

#### Axioms/Guidelines

- What do these stylebooks and guidelines tell us about effective communication?
  - Themes emerge about good (and bad) writing style (axioms)
  - Do they apply to design of policy systems?
- Policy uses metaphors/abstractions to communicate
  - This is not only interface, but modeling ...
- So, lets see what axioms (from the guidelines) apply to policy design ....

# Axiom 1: Know audience (vocabulary)

"She grew on him like he was e coli and she was room temperature Canadian beef."

- Policy that fails to speak the users' language has no chance of success
- Moreover, any policy that requires decisions about topics outside users scope of experience has little chance of success




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
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### Axiom 2: Focus ...

"The knife was as sharp as the tone used by Rep. Shelia Jackson Lee (D-Tex) in the first several points of the parliamentary procedure made to Rep. Henry Hide (R-III.) in the House Judiciary Committee hearings on the impeachment of Present William Jefferson Clinton."

- Seperation of concerns
  - Policy should focus on the topics of user interest
  - Be only as flexible as necessary (e.g., Ismene)
- However, needs to be complete (enough)





# Axiom 4: Structure/tone (interface)

"Her vocabulary was as bad as, like, whatever."

- A confounding interface, no matter how clear the underlying model, is fatal ...
- Interface should be all those things we hope to see from HCI community
  - Intuitive
  - Easy to navigate
  - Targeted to task
  - (focused, simple, ...)




### What does this all mean?

Idea: we want to apply these axioms to drive design of apply?

Narrative Driven Policy Design

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## **Conclusions**



- Security policy design *is* hard
  Lots of ways to make mistakes, some unavoidable
  Policy rarely a factor in systems/interface design
- Community needs to spend more time looking at intent, and less about form and enforcement
   Most of the problem is no longer about technology, it is
  - about providing meaningful interfacesSeparation of the *how* from the *what*
- Idea: narrative driven policy design
  - Not new: storyboarding, etc. is common in HCI
  - Apply to distributed systems security Policy
  - Use tenets of HCI to analysis and modeling DMACS WUPS5 - July Eth, 2004 - Patrick McDaniel - http://www.gatrickmcdaniel.org/ - 11

### Thank you ...

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"Every minute without you feels like 60 seconds."

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