Dolev-Yao-type Abstraction of Modular Exponentiation - the Cliques Case Study

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


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### The SA-GDH.2 Protocol


Cliques SA-GDH.2 protocol with three participants [AST at CCS'98 and IEEE J-SAC'00]



- $\triangleright \alpha$  is a public generator of a group  $\mathcal{G}$  where the DDH problem is believed to be hard
- ► M<sub>i</sub> generates a random key contribution r<sub>i</sub>
- $M_i$  and  $M_j$  share long-term key  $K_{ij}$  ( $Pub = \alpha^{x_i}$ ,  $Priv = x_i$ ) All participants can compute  $\alpha^{r_1 r_2 r_3}$

## Security Goals

#### SA-GDH.2 protocol with group $M = \{M_1, M_2, M_3\}$



Main security goal:

▶ *Implicit Key Authentication*: no party  $M_I \notin M$  should be able to obtain any participant's view of the group key

## Security Analysis

What can we say about the security of these protocols?

- [Steiner & al. 96] provide security proof of the generic Cliques GDH protocols in the case of a passive adversary
- [AST] only provide "sketch proofs"
- These protocols do not appear to fit into any classical security framework



## Adversary Model

Dolev-Yao-type Adversary

- controls the network
- can take part to some sessions (has long-term  $K_{lj}$ )
- can build messages in accordance with certain "symbolic" rules
- rules are defined in order to make the attacker able to perform the same operations as any honest user



# Message Algebra

Our message algebra is defined as follows

- R: set of random private values generated during protocol execution
- ► K: set of long-term secrets shared between pairs of users
- ▶ P: abelian group freely generated from R ∪ K
- G: isomorphic to P through **alphaexp** :  $P \rightarrow G$

Remarks:

- alphaexp(p) usually denoted  $\alpha^p$
- $\mathcal{G}$  was cyclic and is represented by G which is infinite
- freeness implies that  $\alpha^{r_1r_2} \neq \alpha^{r_3}$ ,  $\alpha^{r_1K_{12}} \neq \alpha^{K_{23}}$ , ...


# Adversary Capabilities

Adversary message generation capabilities

- Adversary knows:
  - all elements of G he intercepted
  - ▶ all elements of R he generated
  - all elements of K he shares with other users
- He knows the subgroup of P freely generated from the elements of R and K he knows
- ▶ If he knows  $p \in P$  and  $g \in G$ , he can generate  $g^p$ (= alphaexp(alphaexp<sup>-1</sup>(g) · p))

## Adversary Goal

#### The SA-GDH.2 Protocol



Consider  $M_2$  for instance. Adversary goal is:

- to obtain a pair  $(\alpha^x, \alpha^{xr_2K_{12}^{-1}K_{23}^{-1}})$  (for any x)
- to replace  $\alpha^{r_1r_3K_{12}K_{32}}$  with  $\alpha^x$

# Adversary Attack Strategy

How can he do this?

- Use his (Dolev-Yao) arithmetic capabilities
- Use the services offered by honest users

Services:

•  $M_2$  says: "Send me 3 elements of G, I will exponentiate the first of them with  $r_2K_{21}$  and the third of them with  $r_2K_{23}$ "

We say that  $M_2$  provides the  $r_2K_{21}$ - and  $r_2K_{23}$ -services

- $M_3$  provides the  $r_3K_{31}$  and  $r_3K_{32}$ -services
- $M_1$  says: "I will exponentiate  $\alpha$  with  $r_1K_{12}$  and  $r_1K_{13}$ " 2. This can be seen as a services with fixed input...

#### Attack against the SA-GDH.2 Protocol

Second session:  $\{M_1, M_2, M_3\}$ 

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#### Attack against the SA-GDH.2 Protocol

Third session:  $\{M_1, M_2, M_3\}$ 


 $M_2$  computes  $\alpha^{r_1r'_2r'_3r''_2K_{23}}$  as group key even though the three group members simply followed the protocol definition!

## How to fix this protocol?

We consider as a fix a protocol

- providing implicit key authentication (at least)
- ▶ allowing a group of *n* members to compute  $\alpha^{r_1 \cdots r_n}$
- using the same "building blocks", i.e. exponentiation with random values and long-term two-party secrets

Example:



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#### Theorem:

This is impossible for protocols with at least 4 participants



#### Attack Process

First step:

- Find which services are to be used
- When trying to obtain  $(\alpha^x, \alpha^{xr_2''K_{12}^{-1}K_{32}^{-1}})$ , look for a set of services and values the adversary knows whose product is  $r_2''K_{12}^{-1}K_{32}^{-1}$

Example:


$$r_{2}'' K_{12}^{-1} K_{32}^{-1} = (r_{1} K_{12})^{-1} \cdot r_{1} K_{1I} \cdot K_{1I}^{-1} \cdot (r_{2}' K_{23})^{-1} \cdot r_{2}' K_{2I} \cdot K_{2I}^{-1} \cdot (r_{3}' K_{32})^{-1} \cdot r_{3}' K_{3I} \cdot K_{3I}^{-1} \cdot r_{2}'' K_{23}$$

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#### Attack Process

Is it always a choice of sessions making an appropriate choice of services possible?

No:



- Attacking  $M_1$  requires a pair  $(\alpha^x, \alpha^{xr_1K_{12}^{-1}})$
- Obtaining  $r_1 K_{12}^{-1}$  requires to use the  $r_1$ -service and
- a service containing  $K_{12}$  but all of them contain a random value uniquely originating which we cannot cancel

Use of Services

Is it always a choice of sessions making an appropriate choice of services possible?


Yes, for protocols involving at least 3 participants!


Interesting points:


- We need protocol involving at least 3 group members
- At most 3 sessions are to be considered
- Several ways of writing secrets as product of services
- It is possible for all group members

Is this sufficient to say that all protocols of the family we consider are insecure?

No: The Tri-GDH Protocol







• Attacking  $M_1 \Rightarrow \text{Obtaining a pair } (\alpha^x, \alpha^{xr_1K_{13}^{-1}})$ 

- $ightharpoonup r_1 \Rightarrow$ 
  - 1.  $r_1$ ? No: both  $r_1$  and  $r_x$  have fixed inputs
  - 2.  $r_1 K_{12}$ ? No:  $(\alpha^{r_x K_{13}}, \alpha^{r_x r_1 K_{12}}) \Rightarrow r_y K_{12} \rightarrow (\alpha^{r_x K_{13} r_y K_{12}}, \alpha^{r_x r_1 K_{12}}) \Rightarrow r_y$  but both  $r_x$  and  $r_y$  have fixed inputs


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First type of problematic services:

Starting Services, i.e. services with input fixed to α

Second type of problematic services:

Splitting Services, i.e. if we need to use different services with same inputs



We can only obtain 
$$(\alpha^{xs_1}, \alpha^{xs_2})$$
 (or  $(\alpha^{xs_2}, \alpha^{xs_1})$ )

We defined a number of sufficient conditions making the collection of the required services possible

- The services we must collect may involve one pair of splitting services but no starting service
- The services we must collect may involve one starting service for each term of pair, but no splitting services ( $\approx$ )

...

We checked that at least one of these conditions is verified for any Cliques-type GDH-Protocol with at least 4 participants

## Conclusion


We can systematically break any Cliques-type AGKAP with at least four parties.

- 1. Use our expression of secrets as product of services and select an appropriate set of services verifying one of our sufficient conditions on splitting and starting services
- 2. Collect the required services for obtaining the pair  $(\alpha^x, \alpha^{xs_i})$
- 3. Submit  $\alpha^{x}$  as the value  $M_{i}$  will use to compute his view of the group key
  - We need to consider at most three protocol sessions
  - With *n* parties, the attacker needs to interact with at 7 most n + 1 strands

### **Open Questions**

Tri-GDH Protocol:

- What could computational crypto say about this protocol?
- Could an assumption such as Pseudo-freeness help?



# **Open Questions**

 $\alpha^{xy}, \{ \alpha^{y} \}_{K_{AB}}?$ 

- Cliques-type protocols with MAC's, signature, encryption, products, . . .
- Addressed [Shmatikov & al. 03-04, Boreale & al. 03, Chevalier & al. 03, Kapur & al. 03, ...]
- Transpose our impossibility result to other classes of protocols?
- Proving other protocols secure when considering an infinite number of sessions?

