


**ON ZERO-TESTABLE
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
AND PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE ARGUMENTS**

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ePrint report 2014/981

Goal:


Efficiently verify the correctness of a long computation



Proof should save verifier time!

Publicly Verifiable Non-Interactive Arguments

CRS



Publicly Verifiable Non-Interactive Arguments



Non-Falsifiable

Knowledge Assumptions

(e.g. knowledge of exponent)



Indistinguishability

Obfuscation



Sub-exp.
reduction

Multilinear Maps \\
Graded Encodings


No candidates

Privately Verifiable Two-Message Arguments

Verifier

**(non-reusable)
challenge**

**Untrusted
Prover**



Proof




Kalai-Raz-Rothblum 14: construction assuming

Private Information Retrieval or


Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption

Publicly Verifiable Non-Interactive Arguments


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1. Efficiently falsifiable assumption
 2. Adaptive soundness
 3. Black box use of crypto

Zero-Testable Homomorphic Encryption

Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption




*Zero-Testable
Homomorphic Encryption*



**Weak
ZT**

Graded Encodings



ZT

Standard ZT

Trivial Zero:

$$C(x, y, z) = 0 \Rightarrow \text{ZT pass}$$

$$\text{ZT} \left(\boxed{C(x, y, z)} \right)$$

Candidate: [van Dijk-Gentry-Halevi-Vaikuntanathan 10]

Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers

x

y

z

Non-Zero:

$$C(x, y, z) \neq 0 \Rightarrow \text{ZT fail}$$

Additional properties:

1. *Multi-Key Homomorphism (for 3 keys)*

$$\text{Enc}_{sk_1}(x) \circ \text{Enc}_{sk_2}(y) = \text{Enc}_{(sk_1, sk_2)}(x \circ y)$$

2. *Adversarial Correctness*

Hard to find ciphertexts c_1^*, c_2^* s.t

$$\text{Dec}(c_1^* \circ c_2^*) \neq \text{Dec}(c_1^*) \circ \text{Dec}(c_2^*)$$

*Homomorphic
Encryption*

Bootstrapping

Gentry-Halevi-Vaikuntanathan 10
López-Alt-Tromer-Vaikuntanathan 12

*Graded
Encoding*

*Adversarial
Correctness*

**This
Work**

~~*Zero Testable*~~
*Homomorphic
Encryption*

*Adversarial
Correctness*

*Multi
Key*


Theorem:

Zero-testable 3-key homomorphic encryption
with adversarial correctness



black box

Publicly verifiable non-interactive arguments
with adaptive soundness



Privately verifiable two-message arguments
Publicly verifiable non-interactive arguments ?
from somewhat homomorphic encryption

[Biehl-Meyer-Wetzel 98, Aiello-Bhatt-Ostrovsky-Rajagopalan 00, Kalai-Raz-Rothblum 14]

CRS:



Verifier

Prover




P
PCP proof

**Prover's answers give
public information about P**

The PCP of Babai-Fortnow-Levin-Szegedy

$$M(x) = y$$



P_1, \dots, P_m
Low-degree
polynomials




$$P_1 + P_2 \equiv P_3$$

⋮


$$P_m \equiv 0$$

CRS:



Verifier

Prover



P_1, \dots, P_m

$$\text{ZT}(P_1(x, y, z) + P_2(x, y, z) - P_3(x, y, z))$$

\vdots

$$\text{ZT}(P_m(x, y, z))$$

Proof plan:

Local consistency at a random point



Local consistency everywhere



Global consistency

CRS:

For all:

x

y

z

Verifier

b_x

b_y

b_z

$\{ P_i(x, y, z) \}_{i \leq m}$

Prover

P_1, \dots, P_m

b_z

$b_x \ b_y$

$ZT(P_1(x, y, z) + P_2(x, y, z) - P_3(x, y, z))$

\vdots
 **b_x, b_y, b_z are consistent
with the computation**

$ZT(P_m(x, y, z))$

Conclusion

1. Sometimes weak ZT is sufficient.
2. Better publicly verifiable delegation through private verifiability techniques.
3. Publicly verifiable delegation from standard assumptions?

Thanks!