



Resilience Modeling For Post-Disaster Recovery of Interdependent Systems: Application To Inland Port Disasters

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Defining Economic Resilience

... an ability exhibited by a system that allows it to recover from a disruptive event in a desired time and with an acceptable cost, noting that resilience is planned for in advance of a disruptive event through preparedness investments and activities...



Research Questions

- How to quantify and build metrics for economic resilience?
- How to use economic resilience planning for decision-making guidelines?




The Motivation
The Methodology
The Application
The Conclusions




Interdependent Infrastructures

Department of Homeland Security




Resilience is particularly important in interdependent systems



Disruptions can propagate, resulting in direct as well as wider-spread indirect impacts.

Motivation and Application

Motivation: interdependent systems



Incorporation of interdependence in sector planning to provide holistic picture of economic recovery planning from disaster

Application: multi-modal transport




As US traffic congestion increases, growth of inland waterways will only increase (e.g., containerized freight)



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Measuring Disruption Impacts



Consequences of disruption can be expressed in terms of the output and demand loss normalized by the as-planned sector output


$$\text{Inoperability}(q) = [\text{Output loss}] / [\text{As - planned output}] \quad q \in [0,1]$$

$$\text{Demand perturbation}(c^*) = [\text{Exogenous demand loss}] / [\text{As - planned output}] \quad c^* \in [0, c/x < 1]$$

Measuring Dynamic Recovery

Dynamic Inoperability Model, based on the DIIM [Lian and Haimes 2006]

n -sector economy



Model evolution depends upon $\mathbf{q}(0)$, \mathbf{K}^* , \mathbf{A}^* , $\mathbf{c}^*(k)$


C. Lian and Y.Y. Haimes. Managing the risk of terrorism to interdependent infrastructure systems through the dynamic inoperability input–output model. *Systems engineering*, 9(3):241–258, 2006.



Structure of K^*

K^* represents a sectors willingness to decrease inoperability by investment in inventory and hardening measures during disruptions by maintaining stocks

Distribution of New Equipment and Structures to Using Industries in Producers' Prices, 1992



Line	Commodity	Commodity Description	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	1094	Uranium-radium-vanadium ores	102	789	1000	200	1300								
2	1380	Oil and gas field services													
3	1510	Residential construction													
4	1523	New warehouses construction													
5	1524	New garages & service stations construction													
6	1525	Other new nonfarm bldgs. construction													
7	1526	New religious facilities construction													
8	1527	New hospital construction													
9	1528	New educational facilities construction													
10	1529	New housing units construction													
11	1530	New academic facilities construction													
12	1531	New commercial structures													
13	1532	New government service facilities construction													
14	1533	New health care facilities construction													
15	1534	New academic facilities construction													
16	1535	New commercial structures													
17	1536	New government service facilities construction													
18	1537	New health care facilities construction													
19	1538	Other new conservation & development construction													
20	1539	Other new conservation & development construction													
21	1540	Other new conservation & development construction													
22	1541	Other new conservation & development construction													


Represents investment in maintaining own functionality

Represents investment in maintaining stock by others

K^* is a sparse matrix with structure similar to the BEA capital flow matrix


Modeling Dynamic Sector Recovery

Given: interdependence structure (A^*), demand perturbations (c^*)




- *Sector robustness* is influenced by the initial inoperability and resilience
- *Rapidity* is influenced by the resilience

Resolving Issues with DIIM



Knowing the time to equilibrium allows us to adjust model parameters so that the equilibrium is reached

Mathematical Formulation




$$\min \sum_{k=T}^N [\mathbf{z}(k) - \mathbf{q}(k)]^T [\mathbf{z}(k) - \mathbf{q}(k)]$$

subject to

$$\mathbf{q}(k+1) = \mathbf{q}(k) + \Delta t \mathbf{K}^* [\mathbf{A}^* \mathbf{q}(k) + \mathbf{c}^*(k) - \mathbf{q}(k)]$$

Implementing the Algorithm



Research Contributions

Though the present model is similar in structure to the Dynamic Inoperability Input-Output Model (DIIM) [Lian and Haimes, 2006], it improves on the scope and capability of similar such approaches


Previous studies	Present approach
Interpretation of resilience (K^*)	
Is a diagonal matrix	Has off-diagonal elements
Interpretation of initial inoperability ($q(0)$)	
Initial direct impact on sector output	Initial sector response to demand perturbations

C. Lian and Y.Y. Haimes. Managing the risk of terrorism to interdependent infrastructure systems through the dynamic inoperability input–output model. *Systems engineering*, 9(3):241–258, 2006.



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Case Study: Inland Waterway Port




Mississippi River System

- Largest area-wise inland port in the US
- 2 million tons of cargo annually




Port Waterway Commerce

Main economic sectors



Main trading states



Total = \$937 million

Estimated US\$ million annual amount of export-import through Catoosa in 2007*

* Data Sources:

[1] US Army Corps of Engineers, Tulsa Port of Catoosa

[2] US Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration

Disruption in Port Commerce


- Closure of the port waterway due to hurricane and floods for 14 days
- Daily loss of export-import is registered as demand losses for industries using the port
- Only source of demand losses for industries across the state
- Maximum daily demand loss of US\$ 3.55 million is suffered across port industries

Dynamic Model Behavior

- Rapidity varied from 5 days to 14 days for recovery decisions
- Initial inoperabilities are zero because of localized disruption
- Recovery is complete once stability is achieved

Modeling results for recovery trajectory of port sectors

Faster recovery, better resilience





Planning for Preferred Recovery

Primary Metals





Chart showing degree of investment of Primary Metals into other sectors for recovery

T = Time to stability (rapidity)



Resilience For Port Sectors


Resilience dependence of port sectors on other sector for 5 day stabilization from disruption



Maximum Loss During Recovery


Measure for robustness of economic sectors

Values for sector maximum output losses until recovery in 5 days





Total Economic Losses





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Conclusions

Concepts developed

- Development of interdependent resilience structure for sector recoveries
- Decision based on targeting recovery times
- Dynamic data assimilation and feedback control approach handles vastly complex problem

Case study results and thoughts

- The major sector suffering losses at the port is the primary metals sector (0.51 US\$ maximum daily loss for 5 day recovery)
- Maximum demand losses of 3.50 US\$ million can lead to peak daily output losses of 1.5 US\$ million for port industries if they recover in 5 days
- State-wide losses can build up to 60 US\$ million for a 13 day planned recovery
- Disruptions at Catoosa show sectors should increase their own inventory and structural hardening for faster recovery
- Risk planning behavior shown through estimation of interdependent sector resilience
- Estimates of maximum daily loss before recovery and total economic losses can be combined with resilience estimations to get a decision-making metric

Appreciation

- The U.S. Federal Highway Administration under awards SAFTEA-LU 1934 and SAFTEA-LU 1702
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- Thanks to grad students Cameron MacKenzie (current) and Zach Walchuk (former)

End of Presentation

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