

Evolution of pathogens: a within-host approach

Vitaly V. Ganusov

Theoretical Biology
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands




Outline

- 1 Introduction
 - evolution of virulence
- 2 Evolution of infectious diseases
 - a “within-host” approach
 - changing model details
 - imperfect vaccines
- 3 Conclusions
 - implications for immuno-epidemiology
- 4 Appendix I
 - heterogeneity
 - details
 - vaccines
- 5 Appendix II
 - modelling mortality



Emergence of infectious diseases



R_0 equals the average number of secondary infections causes by an infected host introduced into a wholly susceptible population.



Evolution of pathogens in new hosts



- Once a pathogen has emerged ($R_0 > 1$), the important question is whether it is going to evolve to be benign or virulent.
- The evolution of pathogens is generally considered in terms of the basic reproductive number R_0 .
 - Pathogens evolve to maximize R_0 (i.e., their total transmission).
 - Pathogens evolve their virulence, defined as the reduction in host fitness due to infection with the pathogen.
 - In models, virulence is measured by host mortality rate or case mortality.



The basic reproductive number R_0


For directly transmitted diseases

$$R_0 = \underbrace{\beta N}_{\text{infection rate}} \times \underbrace{\frac{1}{\alpha + d + \nu}}_{\text{duration of infection}} = \frac{\beta(\alpha)N}{\alpha + d + \nu(\alpha)}$$



virulence

Introduced virus strain: 1950




Fenner and Fantini (1999);

virulence was measured in laboratory (standard) rabbits.



virulence

Virus prevalence: 1952


case mortality > 0.99 case mortality ≈ 0.23

Fenner and Fantini (1999);

virulence was measured in laboratory (standard) rabbits.



Virus prevalence: 1970




Fenner and Fantini (1999);

virulence was measured in laboratory (standard) rabbits.



Virus prevalence: 1984



case mortality > 0.99

case mortality ≈ 0.23




Fenner and Fantini (1999);

virulence was measured in laboratory (standard) rabbits.



virulence

Trade-offs for the myxoma virus infection of rabbits




Fenner et al. 1956; Mead-Briggs et al. 1975; Anderson and May 1982^{*}



a "within-host" approach

Within-host dynamics of pathogens



a "within-host" approach

Dynamics of the pathogen and the immune response

$$\dot{P} = rP - hPX,$$

$$P = 0, \text{ if } P(t) \geq D,$$

$$\dot{X} = \frac{sXP}{k + P},$$

$$l(r) = u \int_0^{\Delta} P(t) dt.$$

- Pathogen kills the host if it reaches a lethal density D ;
- There is no transmission from a dead host;
- Pathogens evolve to maximize their total transmission.

P – pathogen, X – immune response, l – total transmission, Δ – duration of infection.

Parameters: $P(0) = 1$, $X(0) = 1$, $h = 10^{-3}$, $k = 10^3$, $s = 1$, $D = 10^9$, $r = 2.08$.

Antia et al. 1994



a "within-host" approach


Dynamics of the pathogen and the immune response

$$\dot{P} = rP - hPX,$$

$$P = 0, \text{ if } P(t) \geq D,$$

$$\dot{X} = \frac{sXP}{k + P},$$

$$l(r) = u \int_0^{\Delta} P(t) dt.$$



P – pathogen, X – immune response, l – total transmission, Δ – duration of infection.


Parameters: $P(0) = 1$, $X(0) = 1$, $h = 10^{-3}$, $k = 10^3$, $s = 1$, $D = 10^9$, $r = 2.08$.

Antia et al. 1994



a "within-host" approach

Total transmission of pathogens



where total transmission

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t) dt.$$



a "within-host" approach

Stochastic heterogeneity in r


average growth rate

$$\bar{r}$$




a "within-host" approach

Stochastic heterogeneity in r




a "within-host" approach

Stochastic heterogeneity in r




a "within-host" approach

Stochastic heterogeneity in r



a "within-host" approach

Stochastic heterogeneity in r



$$f(r, \bar{r}) = \frac{\bar{r}/\sigma^2}{\Gamma(\bar{r}^2/\sigma^2)} \left(\frac{\bar{r}r}{\sigma^2} \right)^{\bar{r}^2/\sigma^2 - 1} \times \exp \left[-\frac{\bar{r}r}{\sigma^2} \right],$$


$$L(\bar{r}) = \int_0^{\infty} l(r) f(r, \bar{r}) dr.$$



a "within-host" approach

Optimal growth rate and total transmission

$$L(r) = \int_0^{\infty} l(r, x) f(x) dx.$$




where $f(x)$ is given by a gamma distribution of r with standard deviation σ .



a "within-host" approach

Changes in virulence


$$M(\bar{r}) = \int_{r^*}^{\infty} f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$




a "within-host" approach

Changes in virulence

$$M(\bar{r}) = \int_{r^*}^{\infty} f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$




$$LD_{50}(\bar{r}) = P_0 : \int_{r^*[P_0]}^{\infty} f(r, \bar{r}) dr = 0.5$$



a "within-host" approach

Estimating epidemiological parameters and trade-offs




$$\hat{\beta}(r) = \frac{l(r)}{\Delta(r)}$$

$$\beta(\bar{r}) = \int_0^{\infty} \hat{\beta}(r) f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$



a "within-host" approach

Estimating epidemiological parameters and trade-offs



$$\hat{\beta}(r) = \frac{l(r)}{\Delta(r)}$$

$$\beta(\bar{r}) = \int_0^{\infty} \hat{\beta}(r) f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$

$$\alpha(\bar{r}) = \int_0^{\infty} \frac{m(r)}{\Delta(r)} f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$




$$\nu(\bar{r}) = \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1 - m(r)}{\Delta(r)} f(r, \bar{r}) dr$$

where $m(r)$ is the probability of host's death following infection.



a "within-host" approach

Trade-offs emerging from the within-host dynamics



To myxoma trade-offs



a "within-host" approach

Short summary

- Within-host and between host dynamics of pathogens are inherently linked.
- Trade-offs for the myxoma virus infection can be originated from simple properties of the within-host dynamics.
 - **but:** other explanations may work too.
- Prediction on the evolution of pathogen virulence may depend on the definition of virulence used.

Ganusov et al. 2002; Gilchrist and Sasaki 2002; André et al. 2003; André and Gandon (2006); Ganusov and Antia 2003, 2006



changing model details

Can virulence be predicted from a single factor?


Table 1 Mortality associated with parasites transmitted with and without vectors

Mortality	Transmission ^a	
	Without vectors	With vectors
>1%	Kuru Variola <i>Corynebacterium diphtheriae</i> <i>Mycobacterium tuberculosis</i> (35) <i>Treponema pallidum</i>	Yellow fever virus <i>Bartonella bacilliformis</i> <i>Rickettsia prowazekii</i> <i>Borrelia recurrentis</i> <i>Leishmania donovani</i> <i>Plasmodium falciparum</i> <i>P. malariae</i> (57) <i>P. vivax</i> (47) <i>Trypanosoma cruzi</i> <i>T. brucei</i>
<1%	Adenovirus Coronavirus Cytomegalovirus Epstein-Barr Herpes simplex Influenza Mumps Papillomavirus Parainfluenza Respiratory syncytial virus Rhinovirus Rubella Rubella (23) Varicella-zoster <i>Bordetella parapertussis</i> <i>B. pertussis</i> (18) <i>Branhamella catarrhalis</i> <i>Calybacterium granulosa</i> <i>Chlamydia trachomatis</i> <i>Gardnerella vaginalis</i> <i>Hemophilus ducreyi</i> <i>H. influenzae</i> (90) <i>Hemophilus</i> spp. (104) <i>Moraxella</i> spp. (88) <i>Mycobacterium leprae</i> (1) <i>Mycoplasma hominis</i> <i>M. pneumoniae</i> (64) <i>Neisseria gonorrhoea</i> <i>N. meningitidis</i> (8) <i>Neisseria</i> spp. (88) <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> <i>S. epidermidis</i> <i>S. saprophyticus</i>	Chikungunya Dengue (41) O'nyong-nyong Oropouche Phlebotomus fever virus <i>Rochalimaea quintana</i> <i>Plasmodium ovale</i> <i>Leishmania tropica</i>






changing model details

Changing pathogen transmissibility




changing model details

Changing pathogen transmissibility



Changing mechanism of pathogenesis






$P(0) = 1, R(0) = R_0 = 10^4, X(0) = 1, h = 10^{-3}, k = 10^3, s = 1, R_d = 3.25 \times 10^3, c = 10^3,$
 $y = 10^5, d = 0.05.$ Heterogeneity is modelled by a normal distribution of r .



changing model details

Changing mechanism of pathogenesis



$P(0) = 1, R(0) = R_0 = 10^4, X(0) = 1, h = 10^{-3}, k = 10^3, s = 1, R_d = 3.25 \times 10^3, c = 10^3,$

$y = 10^5, d = 0.05.$ Heterogeneity is modelled by a normal distribution of r .



Details do matter!

- Changing the structure of the model may dramatically affect the optimal level of virulence.
- It seems unlikely that a single factor can determine virulence of diverse pathogens.



imperfect vaccines

Vaccines and pathogen evolution

- Escape from vaccines



Vaccines and pathogen evolution

- Escape from vaccines
- Evolution of pathogen virulence in response to vaccination

Imperfect vaccines and the evolution of pathogen virulence

**Sylvain Gandon^{*†}, Margaret J. Mackinnon^{*†}, Sean Nee^{*}
& Andrew F. Read^{*}**

NATURE | VOL 414 | 13 DECEMBER 2001 | www.nature.com



Imperfect vaccines and evolution of pathogens

- Epidemiological approach and R_0

$$R_0[\alpha^*, \alpha] = \frac{\beta^*(\hat{x} + \sigma\hat{y})}{d + \alpha^* + \nu^* + \sigma\beta\hat{y}}$$

where \hat{x} and \hat{y} denote mutant and resident, and σ is superinfection parameter.



Imperfect vaccines and evolution of pathogens

- Epidemiological approach and R_0

$$R_0[\alpha^*, \alpha] = \frac{\beta^*(\hat{x} + \sigma\hat{y})}{d + \alpha^* + \nu^* + \sigma\beta\hat{y}}$$

where \hat{x} and \hat{y} denote mutant and resident, and σ is superinfection parameter.

- Both virulence α and transmissibility β are reduced in vaccinated hosts.

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_V &= (1 - r_2)(1 - r_4)\alpha_U, \\ \beta_V &= (1 - r_3)\beta_U[(1 - r_2)\alpha_U],\end{aligned}$$

where r_2 , r_3 , and r_4 are the efficacies of vaccines blocking replication, transmission and virulence, respectively.



Imperfect vaccines and evolution of pathogens

- Epidemiological approach and R_0

$$R_0[\alpha^*, \alpha] = \frac{\beta^*(\hat{x} + \sigma\hat{y})}{d + \alpha^* + \nu^* + \sigma\beta\hat{y}}$$

where $*$ and $\hat{\cdot}$ denote mutant and resident, and σ is superinfection parameter.

- Both virulence α and transmissibility β are reduced in vaccinated hosts.

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_V &= (1 - r_2)(1 - r_4)\alpha_U, \\ \beta_V &= (1 - r_3)\beta_U[(1 - r_2)\alpha_U],\end{aligned}$$

where r_2 , r_3 , and r_4 are the efficacies of vaccines blocking replication, transmission and virulence, respectively.

- Vaccination does not affect trade-offs $\beta = \beta(\alpha)$ and $\nu = \nu(\alpha)$.



Imperfect vaccines: Gandon et al. conclusions


- Anti-growth and anti-virulence vaccines are expected to select for pathogens with high virulence.
- Anti-transmission vaccines are expected to select for pathogens with low virulence.

Gandon et al. 2001



imperfect vaccines

Within-host approach



Model

- response X_1 reduces the rate of expansion of the pathogen population within the host;
- response X_2 reduces the rate of pathogen transmission from infected hosts.

$$\dot{P} = (r - h_1 X_1)P,$$



$$\dot{X}_i = \frac{sX_i P}{k + P}, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \frac{P(t)dt}{1 + h_2 X_2(t)}.$$

Vaccination results in an increase in the number of pathogen-specific immune cells (precursor numbers) existing prior to infection.



Within-host dynamics: anti-growth vaccines





$P(0) = 1$, $h_1 = 10^{-3}$, $h_2 = 10^{-4}$, $k = 10^3$, $s = 1$, $D = 10^9$, $r = 2.08$, pathogen density is multiplied by 10^{-9} , the immune response densities are multiplied by 4×10^{-6} .





imperfect vaccines

Transmission and virulence: anti-growth vaccines





imperfect vaccines

Within-host dynamics: anti-transmission vaccines





imperfect vaccines

Transmission/virulence: anti-transmission vaccines



imperfect vaccines



ES growth rate and virulence: partially vaccinated



For anti-growth vaccines, the precursor number increases from $X_{10} = 1$ to $X_{10} = 2$ (bold red lines) or to $X_{10} = 10$ (plain red lines). For anti-transmission vaccines, the precursor number increases from $X_{20} = 0$ to $X_{20} = 10$ (bold blue lines).



Do results depend on the model?



- In these models, the difference arises due to different description of pathogenesis and as the result, due to high ES virulence in unvaccinated hosts in the right panel (at $p = 0$).

Ganusov and Antia 2006; André and Gandon 2006



Implications for epidemiology

- Epidemiological models can include the within-host dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dS(t)}{dt} &= \lambda - dS(t) - h(t)S(t), \\ \frac{\partial I(t, \tau)}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial I(t, \tau)}{\partial \tau} &= -(d + \alpha(\tau) + \nu(\tau))I(t, \tau), \\ \frac{dR(t)}{dt} &= \int_0^t I(t, \tau)\nu(\tau) d\tau - dR(t), \\ I(t, 0) &= h(t)S(t) = S(t) \int_0^t I(t, \tau)\beta(\tau) d\tau. \end{aligned}$$

- Future studies may investigate the role of mutation, co- and super-infection in determining evolution of pathogens using within-host models.



More implications for epidemiology

- Predictions on the evolution of pathogens may depend on the model used as well on the model parameters, and therefore, building of proper models requires better understanding of the biology of pathogen-host interactions.
- Other factors may further complicate the picture: within-host evolution of pathogens, co- and super-infection, locality of transmission, host evolution, etc.



Acknowledgements

- Rustom Antia and Carl Bergstrom
- Theoretical Biology group at Utrecht University
- Marie Curie Incoming International Fellowship (Framework Programme 6)




Testing model predictions?

- Higher levels of (host) heterogeneity select for more virulent pathogens.
 - High mutation rate of *Neisseria meningitidis* helps escaping immune response.
 - Malaria (*P. falciparum*) infecting resistant adults and nonimmune infants.
- Transmission-blocking vaccines may select for more rapidly growing pathogens
 - ?
- Testing both predictions in serial passage experiments?



Dynamics of the pathogen, resource and the immune response

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{P} &= \frac{rPR}{c+R} - hPX, \\ \dot{R} &= d(R_0 - R) - y^{-1} \frac{rPR}{c+R}, \\ \dot{X} &= \frac{sXP}{k+P},\end{aligned}$$




P – pathogen, R – resource, X – immune response.

Parameters: $P(0) = 1$, $R(0) = R_0 = 10^4$, $X(0) = 1$, $h = 10^{-3}$, $k = 10^3$, $s = 1$, $R_d = 2.7 \times 10^3$,
 $c = 10^3$, $y = 10^5$, $d = 0$, $r = 2.08$.



Changing mechanism of pathogenesis






Heterogeneity ($CV = \sigma/R_d$) is modelled by a gamma distribution in the minimal resource density R_d .

$P(0) = 1, R(0) = R_0 = 10^4, X(0) = 1, h = 10^{-3}, k = 10^3, s = 1, R_d = 2.7 \times 10^3, c = 10^3,$
 $y = 10^5, d = 0.$



Changing mechanism of pathogenesis



Heterogeneity ($CV = \sigma/R_d$) is modelled by a gamma distribution in the minimal resource density R_d .

$P(0) = 1, R(0) = R_0 = 10^4, X(0) = 1, h = 10^{-3}, k = 10^3, s = 1, R_d = 2.7 \times 10^3, c = 10^3,$


$y = 10^5, d = 0.$






vaccines

Changes in trade-offs with vaccination



ANTI-GROWTH



ANTI-TRANSMISSION




Changes in R_0 with vaccination



- Trade-offs do change with vaccination although changes may be small at low efficacy of vaccines (small increase in X_{10} and X_{20}).
- Anti-transmission vaccines may select for more virulent pathogens.



Virulence in unvaccinated and vaccinated hosts







- The relationship between virulence of a pathogen with a fixed growth rate r in vaccinated α_V and unvaccinated α_U hosts is nonlinear.
- Note that in the study by Gandon et al. 2001, $\alpha_V = (1 - r_2)(1 - r_4)\alpha_U$.





vaccines

Total transmission vs. r




vaccines

Total transmission and virulence vs vaccine efficacy



Two stages




Pathogenesis and transmission

- The probability of host survival $S(t)$ until time t is the solution of

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

where $\pi(r, P)$ is the rate of host's death due to pathogen.

$$\pi[r, P] \sim (P/D)^n$$




Pathogenesis and transmission

- The probability of host survival $S(t)$ until time t is the solution of

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

where $\pi(r, P)$ is the rate of host's death due to pathogen.

$$\pi[r, P] = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (P/D)^n$$



Pathogenesis and transmission

- The probability of host survival $S(t)$ until time t is the solution of

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$



where $\pi(r, P)$ is the rate of host's death due to pathogen.

- The total transmission of the pathogen during the infection is

$$I = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

where $\zeta(P)$ is the rate of pathogen transmission.

$$\pi[r, P] = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (P/D)^n$$



Pathogenesis and transmission

- The probability of host survival $S(t)$ until time t is the solution of

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$



where $\pi(r, P)$ is the rate of host's death due to pathogen.

- The total transmission of the pathogen during the infection is

$$I = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

where $\zeta(P)$ is the rate of pathogen transmission.

$$\pi[r, P] = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (P/D)^n$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach

- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach

- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

- Consider a particular case when $\pi \sim P^n$ and $\zeta \sim P$:



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach


- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

- Consider a particular case when $\pi \sim P^n$ and $\zeta \sim P$:

$$\pi(r, P) = \left[\frac{P}{D} \right]^1$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach



- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

- Consider a particular case when $\pi \sim P^n$ and $\zeta \sim P$:

$$\pi(r, P) = \left[\frac{P}{D} \right]^2$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach



- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

- Consider a particular case when $\pi \sim P^n$ and $\zeta \sim P$:

$$\pi(r, P) = \left[\frac{P}{D} \right]^5$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach



- Host survival during an infection is a stochastic process

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} \zeta[P(t)]S(t) dt$$

- Consider a particular case when $\pi \sim P^n$ and $\zeta \sim P$:

$$\pi(r, P) = \left[\frac{P}{D} \right]^{10}$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas

$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.

$$\pi(r, P) = \lambda r^1 P$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas



$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.

$$\pi(r, P) = \lambda r^1 P$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas


$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.

$$\pi(r, P) = \lambda r^2 P$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas


$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.

$$\pi(r, P) = \lambda r^5 P$$



Back to a more general “stochastic” approach: II

- Basic formulas


$$\dot{S}(t) = -\pi[r, P(t)]S(t)$$

$$l(r) = \int_0^{\Delta} P(t)S(t) dt$$

$$M(r) = 1 - S(\Delta)$$

- Traditionally, stochastic host survival is modelled differently, $\pi = \lambda r^m P$.

$$\pi(r, P) = \lambda r^{10} P$$



Summary

- Even in simple “within-host” models, a variety of methods exist to describe pathogenesis.
- Moderate levels of virulence (case mortality) can evolve if rate of pathogenesis $\pi \sim P^n$.
- When $\pi \sim r^m P$, saturation in the transmission rate may help to reduce the case mortality.



Introducing heterogeneity in parameters

- For a parameter X , $f(x) dx$ is the probability that a during a given infection, the parameter X will be in the range $(x, x + dx)$.
- Then total transmission of the pathogen with the growth rate r in a heterogeneous population is calculated as

$$L(r) = \int_0^{\infty} l(r, x) f(x) dx.$$

- Thus, such heterogeneity may arise due to stochasticity in pathogen-host interactions.
- We illustrate the results with heterogeneity in the growth rate r described by a gamma distribution.

